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This paper explores some of the political assump-
tions implicit in the use of social cost-benefit
analysis (SCBA) and the role of economic plan-
ners in using this form of analysis. The paper
is written in four parts. The first discusses, briefly,
the rationale for the adjustments suggested by the
proponents of SCBA. The second discusses the
assumptions about the State necessary to justify
the use of these techniques as a measure of
government objectives. Part three considers
whether the assumptions are consistent with the
behaviour of the governments of most under-
developed countries. The last part considers these
techniques in relation to the role of planners in
the political process.
The rationale
A number of reasons can be given for the
increasing attention being given to SCBA in the
literature of development economics. In particular
it became clear that macro-economic planning
did not prevent the introduction, in many coun-
tries, of projects which turned out to be expensive
failures. In some cases of so-called import sub-
stitution, projects turned out to have negative
domestic value added. A need was therefore felt
for greater use of micro-economic planning
techniques. However, in many cases the market
prices used in private profitability calculations bore
little or no relation to the real cost and benefits to
the nation. Techniques were therefore developed
to introduce shadow or accounting prices for
planning purposes. These efforts culminated in
the publication of a number of books putting
forward integrated systems of SCBA, the most
well known being Little and Mirrlees (1969 and
1974), UNIDO (1972), and Squire and van der
Tak (1975). The principal pricing adjustments
suggested were:
elimination of all transfer payments, such as
taxes and subsidies, that do not represent resource
costs;
the use of world prices in the valuation of
traded goods on the principle that trading pos-
sibilities represent the opportunity cost of those
goods whIch enter into international trade;
use of a measure by which to translate domestic
resource costs into world prices. This can be
either a standard conversion factor or a shadow
exchange rate depending on the unit of account
or numeraire) used;
the adoption of a shadow wage rate to account
for any excess of market wages over the marginal
product of labour;
the use of a rate of discount to take account
of the relative value of payments made in dif-
ferent time periods. This may bear little or no
relation to internal market rates of interest and,
in the first instance, might be an estimate of the
opportunity cost of capital;
the use of a measure (known as the shadow
price of investment or the value of public income)
by which the value of savings (more precisely,
government savings) can be expressed in terms of
the average value of consumption in cases where
a savings shortage is assumed to exist. This
measure also affects the rate of discount used;
the adoption of an income utility function
which relates the value of the consumption of
people at different income levels to the value of
the averäge, in the form of an income distribution
weigh't.
Attempts have been made to estimate all these
parameters either from existing data such as trade
statistics and rural wage rates, or from the revealed
preferences of the government, indicated, for
example, by taxation exemption limits, the con-
sumption of people with income below this level
being asssumed to be of at least equal value to
government income. The proponents of SCBA
suggest that, when the appropriate pricing adjust-
ments are made, the government should select
projects according to their present social value
(PSV) at the chosen discount rate, or according
to the social rate of return where no discount
rate is given. The trade-offs between the different
possible government objectives, of saving foreign
exchange, increasing employment, and growth
maximisation subject to considerations of income
distribution, are numerically defined by the values
given to the various parameters, and the result is
held to represent the value of the project according
to government objectives.
Few economists would suggest that governments
would (or even should) always take decisions
solely on the basis of an estimate of a project's
PSy. Any analysis of political decision-making
would show that the economic considerations
which are embodied in the estimate of the PSY
are only part of the complex set of factors by
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which government decisions are made. However,
this would only invalidate the use of SCBA if the
government so consistently turned down its recom-
mendations that it became inoperative as a
planning technique. In a situation where a govern-
ment consistently ignores the advice of its planners,
it is difficult to conceive of any serious planning. A
more important question is whether the political
assumptions underlying the adjustments have any
validity, and if so in what context.
The assumptions
SCBA can be analytically separated into two
stages: economic analysis and social analysis.
These two stages are clearly identified in UNIDO
(1972) and in Squire and van der Tak (1975), but
are less obvious in L.ittle and Mïrrlees (1969 and
1974). Economic analysis is primarily concerned
with the first five adjustments outlined above,
social analysis with the last two. Economic analysis
is concerned with the maximisation of national
income according to opportunity costs and
undifferentiated by its distribution. Social analysis
is concerned with the distribution of income
between saving and consumption, and between
different income groups. The use of economic
analysis does not require particularly heroic
assumptions about the nature of the State, the
major assumption being the desire by governments
to maximise national income. This degree of
economic nationalism is common to all but the
most grossly neocolonial regimes, although the
assumption may only relate to one among many
government objectives. The results of economic
analysis may come up against political opposition
in cases where it successfully exposes such activities
as transfer pricing or import substitution projects
with little or no domestic value added; however,
the planning technique in itself merely assumes
that the government would like to oppose such
activities and this is only an unreasonable assump-
tion when members of the government stand to
gain directly from the projects concerned. The
major problems in the use of economic analysis
appear to lie in relation to the data that should
be used, as Sen (1972) and Dasgupta (1972) have
pointed out in relation to traded goods; to the
sheer organisational and manpower problems
involved in undertaking such analyses; and to
the relative importance that should be placed
on project planning vis à vis other forms of
planning.
However, economic analysis contains two major
weaknesses, and it is in trying to meet these that
the technique has been extended to social analysis.
The fIrst weakness is that the use of an oppor-
tunity cost rate of discount assumes that the
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government is able to ensure sufficient savings to
achieve the desired rate of growth, whereas the
governments of many underdeveloped countries
feel that they are unable to raise sufficient levels
of savings to achieve the desired level of invest-
ment. In such a context it can be argued that pro-
ject income in the form of savings is more valuable
to them than the generation of additional con-
sumption. The parameter known either as the
shadow price of investment or as the value of
public income is introduced with the effect (in
most cases) of lowering the rate of discount,
raising the shadow wage, and reducing the value
of any other consumption effects. To justify the
use of this parameter as an instrument of govern-
ment policy it is necessary to assume that the
government is politically constrained from using
taxation policy and other macro-economic tools to
raise the level of savings to that level which it
considers optimal, and must, therefore, attempt
to do this indirectly through project selection.
The second weakness of economic analysis is that
additional consumption by people at widely dif-
ferent income levels is valued equally. Here the
implicit assumption is that the appropriate tools
for achieving redistribution of income are
taxation policy and structural reforms, and that
the government is able to use these tools to the
extent that it wishes. The economists' objection to
this is that governments are frequently unable to
achieve desired redistribution objectives directly
and that economic theory quite clearly demon-
strates the principle of diminishing marginal
utility. It is illogical to argue that this principle
applies to commodities but not to the income that
buys them. A weighting system is therefore pro-
posed (e.g. by Squire and van der Tak, 1975)
whereby the value associated with additional
income received by individuals is inversely related
to their level of income. The usual form of func-
tion used, primarily for ease of application, is a
constant elasticity utility function.
Why are these adjustments felt to be necessary? It
seems that economists have focused on two par-
ticular problems which are felt to constrain
development. First, accumulation is inhibited by a
savings shortage and second, the fruits of develop-
ment projects are frequently observed to be
unevenly distributed. The proponents of social
analysis are arguing that the governments of under-
developed countries are seriously concerned with
the distribution of income but are unable to adopt
macro-economic policies to influence it because
of political weakness. In their attempts to find
the necessary parameters they are also equating
social cost benefit analysis with government cost
benefit analysis. It is with reference to government
policy that the adjustments are made. It could be
argued that the equation of government interest
with social interest, and the use of distribution
weights, implies a consensus, while the assumption
of political weakness implies just the opposite.
Do the assumptions make sense?
The postulate that the governments of under-
developed countries are interested in both in-
creasing the rate of growth and redistributing the
benefits is founded on the rhetoric of political
pronouncements rather than on observed actions.
It is difficult to find many underdeveloped coun-
tries that have shown much interest in taking
practical steps to redistribute income away from
the elite and towards the poorest sections of the
population. The same conclusion can be levelled
at the interest in growth. If Baran's concept of
surplus is considered, many countries would be
able to raise adequate levels of investment if
effective measures were taken to channel conspic-
uous consumption, hoarding and non-productive
investment to productive use. It is precisely
because the governments are not prepared (or in
some cases, such as Chile under Popular Unity,
are not allowed) to take effective action against
vested interests that it is felt necessary to use
indirect measures to influence distribution. It is
difficult to escape the conclusion that any project
that would be genuinely effective in directing
income away from the rich towards priority uses
in investment and income for the poorest people
would not even get as far as the identification
stage.
The economist is faced with the possibility that
the use of distribution weighting is unlikely to be
more than a palliative. Indeed, the interest shown
by the large aid donors in SCBA techniques and
redistribution has been seen, by some authors, to
be more concerned with maintaining rather than
transforming the existing structure and dependence
of underdeveloped countries (Leys 1975: 8;
Thomas 1974: 184-5). Can an economist take
seriously the redistributive designs of a government
which persistently refuses to undertake a land
reform or tax the wealthiest section of the popu-
lation? If not, it is necessary to justify social
analysis on a basis other than fulifiling the
objectives of the government. Yet it is information
based on the government's observed policies such
as the minimum income level on which tax is
levied, that is used to calculate the parameters
used in SCBA. This is entirely inconsistent: it is
precisely because the government is unable to
redistribute income through taxation that the use
of distribution weights is justified.
However, if the economist does not make arbitrary
judgements like this he is left with a system of
project appraisal that takes no account of the
need for a higher rate of savings or a greater
measure of redistribution. It is because increasing
numbers of economists feel that insufficient action
has been taken in relation to redistribution, rather
than any fundamental change in the nature of
Third World governments, that the techniques
of social analysis have been put forward.
Social analysis in a political context and the
influence of planners
The above analysis suggests that economists are
trying to influence government policies using the
government's own rhetoric as justification. To do
this they have constructed a model of a constrained
but benevolent government, representative of some
national interest rather than sectional or class
interests. That such governments are rather hard
to find scarcely matters: the economist is merely
adding his own viewpoint to the many others in
the political process.
Much economic theory is written with, at most,
a vague conception of the liberal democratic state.
Through the internai logic of economic theory
(or just from an idea of human justice) it is ap-
parent that, in many countries, there is insufficient
overall saving and insufficient consumption by the
poorest people. One reason is that the rich (and
the army) consume and waste too much and invest
too little in productive activity. Social analysis
can therefore be seen as an attempt by economists
(and the aid agencies that finance their work) to
impose this logic on countries that would other-
wise do very little about redistribution of income.
While government statements are sometimes used
to back the judgements up, they really constitute
an attempt to impose the priorities of economic
planners and aid agencies on recalcitrant govern-
ments, for a variety of different motivessuch as
humanitarianism and the desire to promote
political stabilityor to prevent revolution.
Where a government rules more by force thaa
consensus it is possible to justify an attempt by
economic planners to put forward their viewpoint
on the selection of projects. Whether it is demo-
cratic or not, planners are not robots and will
usually take some point of view. In a country
which is ruled by a combination of repression and
bureaucracy the viewpoint of the bureaucrats, or
the 'econocrats' (Self 1975), will have some impact,
and it is legitimate for the planners (not all of
whom may be interested in such radical notions
as redistribution) to put forward their viewpoint.
Can a case then be made for social analysis,
despite its dubious political assumptions and the
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dangers of excessive influence of 'econocrats', in
conditions where the planning process is separated
from any control by the people that are planned?
With the existing situation in most underdeveloped
countries, social analysis might be justified along
two lines. First, that the alternative is a strategy
which places no premium on redistribution. In
such circumstances, the use of social analysis,
even if somewhat arbitrary and undemocratic,
is likely to give results that are more beneficial
to the mass of the population, despite rather than
because of government objectives. The second
and perhaps more important justification is that
any adequately conducted social analysis should
provide valuable information about the distribu-
tion effects of development projects, which, if
freely available, can be helpful in indicating either
the sort of projects to be encouraged, or avoided,
or the reforms which such projects make
necessary.
Under certain circumstances the assumptions
implict in the use of social analysis may be
plausible. This is the case where a government
would seriously be interested in raising the level
of savings and redistributing income, including
the possibility of actually reducing the incomes
of the elite, but is actively prevented from doing
so by powerful vested interests. In such a case
the techniques concerned might be used to indicate
a way out of a severely constrained position.
The case for social analysis therefore rests
insecurely on the present predicament of the
underdeveloped countries, for many of which
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redistribution is a slogan to be ignored in practice,
while for others the constraints imposed by
external forces prevent effective action. It can be
shown that the most efficient form of redistri-
bution is through taxation transfers rather than
the selection of a set of projects that are sub-
optimal from the production efficiency viewpoint
(Diamond and Mirrlees 1971). In any society
where there is some degree of popular partici-
pation in the planning process and where
development priorities can be agreed and acted
upon, it should not be necessary to use social
analysis as a substitute for macro-economic action.
The role of social analysis is therefore limitd to
a transitional phase where the economic planner
feels justified in asserting that the government is
taking insufficient action in encouraging savings
and the redistribution of income and tries to
change this, while pretending to implement
government policy. He may take this attitude
because, by the nature of his job, he has a longer
time perspective than the government or he may
not be interested in redistribution at all. Whatever
the case it is certain that planners will give their
opinions and that, in the absence of any vehicle
for popular involvement, their opinion may bejust as relevant as that of the government. It
might also be said that the bureaucracy is effec-
tively part of the government. Social analysis can
be justified, but it is very much a second-best
approach in a situation where the mass of the
people are excluded from decision-making and
where the government is too weak to redistribute
income through macro-economic policy.
